The FOMC members were also concerned about large outflows of short-term capital that occurred during 1971. At the April meeting and continuing through the July meeting, a new clause was added to the policy consensus stating that the Committee desired to moderate these outflows. The policy consensus was further modified at the August meeting to take account of the President's New Economic Program. A clause was added stating the intention of the Cominittee to "foster financial conditions consistent with the aims" of the new program.
In accordance with the objective of promoting economic expansion without renewed inflation, the Committee desired throughout most of 1971 both relatively low interest rates and moderate growth of monetary aggregates. These intermediate objectives were to be achieved by setting forth specified ranges for measures of money market conditions -money market interest rates and net borrowed or free reserves -to be achieved by the Desk during the interval between each Committee meeting.
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As the year progressed, conflicting views on the relative isnportance that should be assigned to interest rates and monetary aggregates became evident. For example, at the May 11 FOMC meeting some members expressed concern "that expansion in M 1 [currency plus demand deposits held by the nonbank' public] at the first-quarter pace for an extended period would be inconsistent with an orderly reduction in the rate of inflation." Moderation of monetary growth would have required that the Desk be instructed to follow a less expansionary open market policy, which in the near term, most likely would aFor a discussion of this type of operating strategy see page 13.
have lead to higher interest rates. Other members expressed the view that "sharp increases in long-term rates at this juncture might have adverse consequences for spending . . . and might thus pose a threat to the economic recovery under xvay.' These members were reluctant to accept a more restrictive open market stance.
Later in the year an opposite type of conflict developed when the money stock had ceased to expand and interest rates had fallen. At the Novesnber meeting " [t] he view was expressed that it would be particularly unfortunate in this climate for the recent weak performance of the monetary aggregates to persist for long, since the lack of significant growth in the aggregates could become an isnportant independent source of uncertainty. At the same time, some meatbers cautioned against unduly aggressive action to stimulate monetary expansion."
An article in the Federal Reserve Bulletin discussed the possibility that such conflicts could develop:
These desires may sometimes turn out to be in conflict; fur example, monetary aggregates as a group may he rising more rapidly than desirable while credit cussditions may he tightening snore than desirable. Meeting one desire by holding back on the provisioss of reserves in order to restrain growth in bank credit and money would tend, at least tensporarily, to thwart the other desire by leading to even more tightening of credit conditions. Under such circs,smstances, the Account Manager would have to adjust his operations -tlses'ebv affecting dayto-day money market conditions -in line with the sense of priority among operating objectives given by the FOMC."
Throughout most of 1971, the Conmsnittce sought to resolve this problem by cautiously adjusting snarket conditions in seeking desired rates of monetary expansion.
This article is primarily concerned with an analysis of problems inherent in the operating strategy used by the FOMC. The following definitions are used: policy refers to the ultisnate objectives of FOMC actions -total spending, output, emplovsnent. prices, and the balance of payments; intermediate objectives are desired movements in monetary aggregates and interest rates to achieve the Committee's ultimate objectives; operating strategy refers to the specific instructions given to the Desk as a sneans of achieving desired movements in the intersnediate objectives.
The suppiement at the end of this article reviews in greater detail the FOMC decisions in 1.971 as pre- 
Implementing Policy With a Money Market Conditions Strategy
The operating strategy of the Desk remained essentiall)' the same during 1971 as it had been in past years. This sts'ategy, as described by Governor Andrew F. Brimmer, was as follows:
They [the views of time menshers of the FOMC] svouid also probably contain enough common dcmessts relating to operating tactics to add up to a pattern of belsayior which call be described as the pursuit of a money market strategy in the conduct of open market operations. Basic to this strategy is the focus osl a configuration of morley snarket conditions as operating guides for the Manager of the SOMA [System Open Market Account] . While the specific money market vanables have varied over tune, they have typically included: ( 1) member bank borrowings frosn the Federal Reserve Banks;
2) net free reserves; (3) the Federal funds rate; and (4) time 3-month Treasury bill rate. These money market variables are to be used by the Manager to influence the behavior of a variety of intermediate financial variables, which may' include: (1) the general structure of nominal interest rates; (2) nsonetarv or credit aggregates (such as tile money supply -broadly or narrowly defined, member bank credit, deposits (If nonbank financial institutions, Or similar qi santitative measures) ; and (.3) the generai environment of credmt and banking market as reflected irs expectations, and the demand for and supply of total credit in tile economy. in emther words. through reserve absorption or supplying operations isl tile ITsarket, tile Manager of the SOMA attempts to bring about or maintain a desirable set of naonev market conditions (e.g., raising or lowering time 3-month Treasury bill yield or rates on Federal ftnscls l with tile expectation that the iutenlsediate msloetary variallles (e.g., bank credit or money supply) will contract or expand at a rate consistent with the requirements of econosnie stabilization. For each F()MC meeting, tile staff prepares an musalvsis of time reiationshitls likely to prevasi among snossev market ('onditions, interest rates, and the moss ciary aggregates over a coming period, isldic.ating lhe growth rates in vanslus aggregates cxpeeteci to he associated with each of several described kinds of money market conditions.I The operating clause of the directive during 1971 placed varying emphasis on the intermediate objec- Systesn open market operations until the next meeting of the Committee shall be conducted with a view to snaintaining prevailing money market conditions while accomsnodating additional downward movements in long-term rates.
Aggregates were relegated to the proviso clause which specified that money market conditions were to "promptly be eased somewhat further if it appears that the monetary aggregates are falling short of the growth path desired." At the March and April meetings, the proviso clause was modified to specify that money market conditions should be modified if it appeared that the monetary and credit aggregates were deviating significantly frosn the growth paths expected.
At the May 11 meeting the language of the directive was shifted to place greater emphasis on growth of monetary and credit aggregates. Other objectives were also specified, including "taking account of the current Treasury financing, developments in capital snarkets, and uncertainties in foreign exchange markets."
The May directive specified that, initially, money smsarket conditions should be maintained at those currently prevailing. Thereafter, money market conditions were to be consistent with the objectives stated, including moderating growth in snonetary and credit aggregates. At the remaining FOMC sneetings in 1971, the language of the directives gave primary emphasis to monetary and credit aggregates. In addition, at several meetings it was noted that capital market developnlents should he taken into account as well as Treasury financings.
Growth rates of nionetary aggregates were not the sole concern of the FOMC in 1971. However, at every meeting the aggregates were discussed and at snost meetings some members of the FOMC expressed concern about their current and projected growth rates. At each meeting growth rates of the aggregates expected to be consistent with given snoney market conditions were presented to the Committee. To the extent that the Committee was interested in growth of the aggregates, these projections probably influenced the decisions of the FOMC members on money market conditions the Desk was instructed to maintain.
Projecting the Growth of Money
During the first half of 1971 projected growth rates for money that were expected to result from the adopted set of money market conditions were substantially below actual growth rates of money. On the other hand, during the second half of the year, projections, again based on the assumption of adopted money market conditions, were substantially above actual growth rates.
At the first three meetings of 1971 money was expected to grow at an annual rate of about 6 to 7.5 percent during the first quarter. The actual rate was 9.4 percent.°In the second quarter, estimates for the growth of money consistent with the adopted money market strategy ranged from about & to 9 percent at the April and May meetings. At the May meeting it was expected that "a sharp firming of money market conditions would be required to slow expansion in M 1 sufficiently during the rest of the second quarter to achieve a substantial moderation of growth over the quarter as a whole." Table I shows that there was some firming of money market conditions in May and June; however, money grew at an 11 percent rate over the second quarter.
The FOMC desired a more rapid growth in money over the first part of 1971 than had occurred in the fourth quarter of 1970. However, the rapid increase in money that occurred over the first half of the year clearly exceeded that expected to accompany the money market conditions adopted by the Committee. As early as the March 9 meeting, when a 7 percent snonetary growth rate was projected for the first quarter, the FOMC decided that: money market rates were to be increased somewhat if the aggregates were rising considerably faster than expected. . "Following tise procedure used by the staff analysis for the FOMC, quartes'ly growth rates are ealcsslated on the basis of the daily-average level in the last month of the quarter reiatiye to tisat in the last month of the preceding quarter.
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Money IAarket~ondittotn
A~e'uge 4f Dusty~igurn At the April 6 meeting, when the first quarter growth rate of money was estimated at & percent, the FOMC stated:
it would like to see more moderate expansion in the monetary aggregates in the second quarter than had occurred in the first.
From the March 9 meeting to the August 24 meeting, the Policy Record stated, in general, that open market operations were initially aimed at maintaining prevailing money market conditions, and then aimed at achieving slightly or somewhat firmer money market conditions as incoming data indicated the monetary aggregates were expanding significantly faster than expected.
During this period only gradual tightening of money snarket conditions was permitted. For example, in the period prior to the April 6 meeting:
efforts were made during the period to counter repetitive tendencies toward undue finnness that arose frosn market factors affecting reserves.
Also in the period immediately following tlse May 11 itseeting:
System open market operations had been directed at maintaining prevailing money market conditions in light of the Treasury financing then in process and the sensitive state of conditions in capital mnrkets.
In late June the growth of money for the third quarter, with prevailing snoney market conditions, was projected to be at a slightly slower rate than the second quarter, and at about 9 percent with some firming in money market conditions. At the July 27 meeting projections were revised downward slightly to about an & to 9 percent rate with some further firming of money market conditions. The actual annual growth rate for money over the third quarter was 3.8 percent.
At the September 21 meeting it was projected that if prevailing money market conditions were maintained, growth in M, would be slower in the fourth quarter than in the third quarter. At the October meeting growth of M 5 was projected to be about the same rate in the fourth quarter as the third quarter, assuming prevailing money market conditions. Money market conditions in fact eased, yet the actual growth rate for the fourth quarter was 1.1 percent.
Inconsistency of Money Market Conditions and Desired Growth of Money
Although snoney market conditions approved at each meeting of the FOMC as operating instructions for the Desk may have been consistent with the members' intermediate objectives for market interest rates, these conditions were not consistent with the growth rates of money expected by the members. The growth trend of money accelerated at an exfremely rapid rate over the first seven months of 1971 and then decelerated at an equally rapid rate in the latter part of the year.
Periodically some members of the FOMC expressed concern about the growth paths of the monetary aggregates that were resulting from the money market operating strategy. For example, Mr. Kimbrel dissented at the April meeting because he "believed that higher short-term interest rates would be desirable mainly to hold growth in the monetary and credit aggregates to a moderate pace in order to avoid a rekindling of inflationary expectations." At the May meeting "[t]he view was widely held among members that expansion in M 5 at the first-quarter pace for an extended period would be inconsistent with an orderly reduction in the rate of inflation." At the December meeting "[ci onsiderable concern was expressed about the persistent weakness of key monetary aggregates despite the progressive easing of money market conditions in recent months."
In early 1971 the rapid acceleration was initially viewed as representing a make-up for the slower than desired growth rate in the fourth quarter of 1970, when growth of money had slowed to a 3.8 percent rate. However, over the last half of 1970 money had grown at a 5.2 percent rate. Make-up for the fourth quarter slowdown in monetary growth was very rapid; money rose at a 9.4 percent rate in the first quarter and at an 11 percent rate in the second quater. From June rate.
In the third quarter of 1971, the early stage of the deceleration of money was vicwcd as a welcome offset to rapid growth over previous snonths of the year. At first the FOMC was reluctant to push for a more rapid growth of money. However, by the November 16 meeting, the FOMC clearly desired to reverse the trend growth of money. The Cosnmittec desired: sosnewhat greater growth in monetary and credit aggregates over the months ahead, recognizing that pursuit of that objective might require appreciably easier money market conditions. Until mid-Novesnber the Desk moved cautiously within the money market directive to prevent rapid deceleration of money. Beginning in September, the Policy Record states that, in general, open market operations were directed at a gradual easing of money market conditions in light of the continuing tendency of the snonctary aggregates to fall below expected paths.
As shown in Table I , money market conditions eased somewhat from Septesnber through December. however, until after mid-November easing was relatively gradual. The Federal funds rate, svhich averaged 5.53 percent between the late Ju]y and late August meetings, fell to only 5,09 percent, on average, prior to the mid-November meeting. The money stock did not respond to this cautious easing of money market conditions. There was no growth, on average, in snoney from mid-September to mid-December.
Factors Influencing Money Growth in 1971
In published explanations of the behavior of money growth last year the Federal Open Market Committee placed primary emphasis on factors that were asserted to determine the demand for money. The following quotes illustrate this view:
The rate of growth of both currency and privately held demand deposits rose because of considerably lower interest rates than earlier and the post-strike rebound in economic activity ["Financial Developments At the time of the previous meeting of the Coinmittee it had been expected that growth in M 5 would slow from tlse average annual rate of 10 per ceut recorded us the first 7 months of the year, in part in a lagged response to earlier increases in short-term interest rates, and that M 2 would continue to expand at about the moderate rate that had emerged in July. For both measures, however, actual growth rates in August were lower than had been anticipated partly for reasons related to the flows of funds into foreign eun~encies, As at the previous meeting, staff analysis suggested that the effects of the new economic program on desrsands for money, together with lagged reactions to earlier increases in short-term interest rates, should tessd to produce much lower average rates of growth in the monetary aggregates over the rest of 1971 thass had been recorded earlier in the year [Federal Reserve Bulletin (January 1972), pp. 36, 37] .
It seems likely that the sharp slowing of M 1 growth in August was in large part attribntable to the heavy outflow of dollars into foreign exchange markets. Weakness continued in September, however, after the outflow was severely cut back. This was apparently related to a reduction in demands for money balances in response to greater confidence and expectation of declining interest rates resulting from the President's new economic program Staff~asralysis suggested that the effects of two factors that had been tending irs recent months to hold down demands for money -moderation of inflationarv expectations as a result of the new economic program, and lagged reactions to the high short-term interest rates of late spring and early summer -prcshahly had about run their course. According to the analysis, if money market conditions were similar to those prevailing or slightly easier, The rate of expansion in the narrowly defined money stock (M 3 ), which had declined substan-tially in the third quarter from the very rapid pace established earlier in the year, slowed further to a modest I per cent annual rate 0 f growth, as public demands for cash balances remained small in the wake of the vesy large build-up in liquidity over the first half of the year.
M, may not have responded snore sensitively to factors that generally prosnote growth in this aggregate, in part because time public decided to reduce precautionary balances hisilt up earlier in the year when there was greater concern about the economic outlook, hi addition, some money-holders mnay have been gradually shifting out of cash balances into interest-bearing assets in the belief that the wage-price control program would meet with success amsd that interest rates would he lower in the future. Finally, experieisce indicates that it takes time for the public to adjust its cash balances upward in response to lower short-term interest rates ["Financial Dex'ekspmessts in the Fourth Quarter of 1971,"
Federal Reserve Bulletin (February 1972) pp. R5-96, 98] .
A Supply and Demand Analysis
These propositions can be examined with demand and supply analysis. In Figures I-IV, the demand curve for money balances is represented by "D", and the supply curve for money balances by "5". Quantities of money (NI) demanded and supplied are expressed as dependent upon the current interest rate (i). Let us assume that the demand for money depends negatively on past values of the interest rate and positively upon growth of income as the previous quotes suggest. These factors operate to shift D. The money supply also depends on the snonetary base. An increase in the base shffts S to the right and a decrease in the base shifts S to the left.
A couple of expositional points should be csnphasized at this point. The money stock, quantity of money balances demanded and quantity of money balances supplied, is measured along the horizontal axis in Figures I-TV. The money supply and money demand refer to the curves labeled S and D. A change in the money supply would appear as a shift in the curve labeled S. The money stock is determined by the interaction of money supply and money demand. Values of the current interest rate are measured on the vertical axis of the graphsJ As the interest rate rises the quantity of money supplied rises, even though the monetary base is unchanged; for example, banks reduce their excess reserves. In Figures I-TV this would appear as a movement along S. As the interest rate rises the quantity of money balances demanded decreases and this appeams as a movement along D.
Lagged values of the interest rate enter as shift parameters in the demand for snoney function.
In Figures I-TV the size of the change in the money stock resulting from a shift in the demand for money depends upon the slopes of D and S. If these cum-ves have relatively steep slopes, as shown in the illustrations, then a shift in either D or S will have less of an effect on the money stock and relatively more of an effect on the interest rate than if the curves are drawn with flatter slopes. Most esnpirical estimates indicate that the percent response of both the supply and demand for money balances to a percent change in short-term interest rates is small. This implies a relatively steep slope for each curve. Therefore, this analysis incorporates these empirical results.
Demand Factors -Over the first half of 1971, because interest rates had declined in the second half of 1970 and growth of income accelerated in the first half of 1971, the above analysis would suggest that the demand for money (D) shifted to the right from D to D' as shown in Figure I . If the supply curve (5) is unchanged (that is, no change in the base), then the interest rate rises to V from i and the money stock expands to M' from M, Interest rates rose in the first half of 1971 and growth of income slowed somewhat in the second half of the year. Tlus would imply, following the conjectured relationship between lagged interest rates, income and the demand for money given in the above quotes, that the demand for money was shifting to the left during the second half of 1971, as illustrated If the supply of money (5) is unchanged (that is, no change in the monetary base), then growth of the money stock that occurred was completely demand determined, as postulated in the above quotes. However, as long as the response of the money supply to changes in the base is not zero, then Federal Reserve open market operations which alter the growth of the base influence the supply of money, and hence, the snoney stock outstanding.
Supply Factors -Consequently, for a more complete analysis of money growth during 1971, behavior of the monetary base must also be considered. Growth of the base accelerated markedly during the first half of 1971, then decelerated sharply in the second half of the year. Therefore, the explanations of Figures I and II must be broadened to include shifts in S. Figure III illustrates the conditions for the first half of 1971 taking the supply factors into account. From December 1970 to July 1971 the monetary base grew at a 9.4 percent annual rate. As the base grew rapidly, the money supply function (5) was substantially shifted to the right to 5'. Taking supply effects into account, the interest rate rises only to i", but the money stock expands to NI" instead of' only to M'. 
Effect of Operating to Offset Changes In Interest Rates
Figure V may be used to illustrate problems that can arise in controlling the growth of money when the Desk is instructed to use open market operations to maintain a narrow range for short-tersn interest rates or persnit only gradual changes in interest rates. Suppose that there is an increase in the mnoney demand curve from D to D', as illustrated in Figure V , and the Desk has been instructed to prevent the interest rate from rising above i". If no offsetting action is taken the interest rate will rise to i', above the upper bound of the Desk's instructions. To keep the interest rate below i" the Desk would buy securities, which would increase the growth of the base and shift S to 5' as shown in Figure V . The interest rate temporarily rises only to i", but as shown in Figure V , money rises to M" rather than M'. Assuming the growth of income is positively related to the growth of snoney, then the growth of income accelerates, the demands for money and credit rise, and the Desk must again increase the grosvth of the base to prevent a further rise in interest rates. By reversing this analysis, it can be seen that if market rates are falling and the Desk is given instructions to operate within too narrow a range on the interest rate then the opposite situation could arise.
Therefore, FOMC instructions to the Desk to prevent desnand induced changes in market interest rates result in asnplifying the fluctuations in the rate of growth of the money stock. When in the face of demand induced changes in interest rates the FOMC gives the Desk instructions to maintain interest rates within a narrow hand, the gro\\'th of the money stock can be considered demand determined. However, "demand determined" in this case has quite a different meaning from that in Figures I and II where no change occurred in the money supply function, that is, no change in the monetary base, The money stock is demand determined in the case where the base changes because the Desk is instructed to resist desnand induced changes in mnarket interest rates which are not desired by the FOMC. In this circumstance the FOMC faces the decision of whether to control the growth of money or temporarily offset demand induced changes in interest rates, If the decision is made to control market interest rates, then the growth of money may deviate significantly from the expected growth rate.
The relative weights attached by mesnbers of the Commnittee to money stock growth and interest rates were given careful consideration in the decisions of the FOMC, For examnple, at the May 11 and June 29 meetings the possible short-run interest rate effects of open market operations necessary to substantially slow the growth of money influenced the decisions of the Committee.
May ii Meeting
In the discussion Committee members expressed concern both about the recent high rates of growth in the monetary aggregates and about the marked increases that had occurred in long-term interest rates, The view was widely held among members that expansion in M, at the first-quarter pace for an extended period would be inconsistent with an orderly reduction in the rate of inflation. Also widely held, however, was the view that sharp increases in long-term rates at this juncture nmight have adverse consequemsces for spending, particularly in the residential constructiors and State and local government sectors, and might thus pose a threat to the economic recovery under way.
Although there were some rather snarked differences in the stress that individual members placed on these two types of considerations, the Committee agreed that it would not be desirable at present either to revert to the money market conditions that had prevailed until the end of April or to seek the amos nt of firming tlsat evidently would he required to achieve a substantial slowing of growth in the aggregates over to tise second quarter.
June 29 Meeting
In the Comsrsittee's discussion considerable concerñ Every open market operation, regardless of its purpose, affects the base. Open market operations aimed at offsetting market detennined movements in interest rates result in accelerations or decelerations of the growth of the base and hence, shifts in the money supply function. If greater short-run variations in interest rates were permitted, the FOMC would be better able to control the growth trend of money.
Money, Base, and Money Market Conditions
Movements in the base paralleled movements in the money stock in 1971. as shown in Table II 9 Over any period of time, there will be a set of money market conditions, a growth rate of base, and a growth rate of money consistent with a given course of open market actions, However, open market operations that achieve a set of money market conditions desired by the Committee may not he consistent with a growth of the base necessary to achieve the growth rate of money also desired by the Committee. Table I , money market conditions firmed in the period March through July. However, as shown in Table II , the growth rate of the base accelerated from 8.4 percent in March to 10 percent in May and then remained at about a 9 percent rate through July. Such a growth path for the base clearly did not imply a much slower growth of money. Over the second half of the year money market conditions eased markedly, but the base decelerated drastically. The growth path of money paralleled the growth path of the monetary base, not the pattern of money market conditions. The situation where the growth pattern of money deviated from that expected from specified money market conditions is not a situation peculiar to 1971. This same pattern can be traced in the Policy Record of the FOMC in prior years. ' Desk may bc in tructed to maintain prevailing money tinction has to be made between the short run cffect market conditions in other words usc open market of a change in the base and the longer-mn effects of such actions. The short iun effect of accelerating the operations to re ist a further use in market ratcs. To growth of the base i to lower market interest rates do so, the Desk probably would have to accelerate its while a deceleration of the ba e puts upwaid pressure purchase of securities, and thus growth of the base on maiket rates and results in firming of other money would accelerate. The initial effect nould be to slow mark t conditions however longer-run effects of such or to lower market interest rates.
As shown in
This acceleration of the base leads to an acceleration in the growth of money, and over time total spending rises more rapidly. An increased demand for credit develops, and thus additional upward pressures on market interest rates follow. "Maintaining existing money market conditions," or even permitting only "some moderate firming in money market conditions" may require a further acceleration in the base. This process creates severe problems when the FOMC attempts to control the growth of money by using a money market strategy.
If money market conditions are firmed enough to actually slow the growth of the base, then the growth of money slows. However, if the slowdown of money is maintained, then longer-run effects of this policy on income and the demand for credit lead to falling market rates and easier money market conditions. As rates fall the FONTC may reason that its open market operations have caused the easing in the money market and that the decline in market interest rates indicates that open market operations are exerting a more expansionary (or less restrictive) effect on their policy objectives. The FONT C may therefore be reluctant to increase its purchases of securities to halt a rapid deceleration of the base. Again, from a money market operating strategy, it appears the Desk is attempting to achieve a reversal in the growth trend of money. However, from an analysis that emphasizes growth of the base as the primary determinant of the growth of money, the money market operating strategy again spells considerable problems for money control." (1) Although the adjustment patterns differ among the models, all of the models imply that in the second and later quarters after the change in Ba the responses of both the short-tern, interest rate and the long-tern, interest rate decay rapidly.
2 ) Using Ba to control the term structure of interest rates is effective only in the quarter of the policy action. By the second quarter most of the effect of the policy action disappears and may actually be reversed if income is especially responsive to changes in B''.
3 ) A constant interest rate policy has the following characteristics according to these models ( a ) control of demand deposits is forfeited in the quarter in which the policy is instituted; (b) control of time deposits is forfeited after the first quarter; and (e) the sharp revet-sal of the response to B'' after the first quarter, and the resulting shift in the relative influence on the shorttenn interest rate of the initial changes in B'' and income, make the conduct of an interest rate policy in succeeding quarters increasingly complicated. Past experience with a money market operating strategy' has not led to stable interest rates and has frequently resulted in a discrepancy between actual and desired growth rates of money. Prolonged rapid increases and decreases of the money stock that accompanmed this strategy, through their effects on total spending, price expectations and consequently the demnand for credit, have beemm a major factor in the marked fluctuations in market rates during the past six years. Also, sharp accelerations and decelerations of the monetary base which have been necessary at times to offset wide swings in time gro~vthof money have induced short-run instability into the money market.
If the growth of the money stock in 1971 was completely demand determined (no shift in the money slower than desired growth in money in the fourth quarter of 1970 amid also desired to see further declines in long-term interest rates-Money market rates fell substantially durimig Jam,mrry and February.
Beginning in February, money began to grow very rapidly amid several lomag-terni interest rates began to rise. At the last three meetings of this period, the Committee called for accommodation of any decline in hongterm rates. Proviso clauses were added to the directives callimig for an adjustment of money market conditions should the growth of aggregates deviate significantly from the desired paths.
January 12 Meeting
The 1970 recessiomm \vas clearly in evidence at this meeting. For example, real GNP was expected to show a decline iii the fourth quarter of 1970, largely due to the automobile immdustry strike. The unemployment rate rose to 6 percent in December 1970, and the U. S. trade balance was reported to have deteriorated further in November. The fourtla quarter deficit in the balance of paymemits on a liquidity basis was estimated to be about the same as in the tlnrd quarter-, that is, about $3 billion.
Projectiomis by the staff of the Board of Governors indicated a sharp recovery would begin in the first quarter, primarily-as a result of a resumption of auto strength in the economy was expected to come from residential construction and state and local spending. Consumer expenditures were expected to increase only moderately, apart from the anticipated return to a higher rate of new car purchases early in the year, while defense spending and fixed investment were not expected to bolster economic activity over the first half of the year.
Although money growth viewed over a longer time period was about in line with the desired rate, a shortfall had occurred in the fourth quarter of 1970. The Committee had desired a 5 percent rate of money growth, compared with an actual rate of 3.8 percent. Analysis presented to the Committee at the January meeting indicated more easing of money market conditions would be necessary in order to expand Mm in the first quarter at a 7.5 percent rate. The Committee decided to seek "some moderate easing of money market conditions." Although a proviso clause was not directly included in the directive, the "Record of Policy Actions" indicates that members desired enomigh easing in money market conditions to be able to make up for the slower fourth quarter growth in money.
Mr. Francis dissented from this decision. He desired a continuation of a 5 percent growth rate of money, which was about the average rate in the second half of 1970. With this rate of growth of money he felt that the "longer-run performance of production and prices would be better than if money were to expand at some faster rate." In addition, he desired less emphasis on money market conditions in implementing open market operations.
February 9 Meeting
Some renewed evidence of upward pressure on prices was given at this meeting. The consumer price index rose considerably in December, and wholesale prices rose rapidly in January, due in part to an increase in agricultural prices.
Following the January meeting both long-and shortterm interest rates fell, which was thought to reflect the reports of weak economic activity and market expectations of lower rates which had been buttressed by reductions in the prime lending rate and the discount rate. It was noted at this meeting that money had increased less in January than had been expected earlier. The Pohcy Record stated that open market operations had been aimed at somewhat easier money market conditions initially after the January meeting, and then sought more easing as money fell short of Committee expectations.
Even with the slow January increase, growth of money was expected to be at about a 6 percent annual rate in the first quarter, assuming the prevailing money market conditions were maintained. Although the Committee agreed to "accommodate further declines in long-term interest rates," the February "Record of Policy Actions" reported that mnembers of the Conimittee differed in their views concerning objectives for money and shortterm credit markets and monetary and credit aggregates. Some members continued to want more easing in money market conditions, while other members wanted these conditions unchanged in view of the recent and prospective rapid growth of monetary aggregates other than mnoney and the ummdesirable conseqimences of lower shortterm rates for international capital flows. Also, some members expressed a desire for less emphasis on short-nm fluctuations in money in the period ahead.
The Committee directed open market operations to "he conducted with a view to maintaining prevailing production. The rate of increase of real GNP was expected to slow in subsequent quarters. Part of the money market conditions while accommodating additional downward movements in long-term rates." In addition, the Committee added a proviso clause stating that it desired to have money market conditions "promptly" eased if growth of monetary aggregates fell below their desired paths. "The Committee also agreed that its objectives for interest rates would be facilitated if, to the extent feasible, needs to supply reserves were met by purchases of longer-term Treasury securities."
Mr. Francis dissented from the February directive for reasons similar to those at the previous meeting. Namely, he preferred a 5 percent growth rate for money and less emphasis on money market conditions in implementing momietary policy.
March 9 Meeting
Yields on new issues of corporate and municipal bonds began to rise in early February, although short-term rates continued to fall. Several Committee members expressed concern about the increases in long-term rates. The desirability of renewed declines in long-term rates was generally agreed upon, but it was also recognized that "further sizable declines in short-term interest rates would not serve a useful purpose." Some members indicated a desire to have some modest increase in shortterm rates in view of recent large capital outilows and the expected rapid growth of monetary and credit aggregates.
At the March meeting it was mioted that Mm, M 1 and the adjusted credit proxy grew more rapidly in February than had been expected at the previous meeting. Analysis presented at the March meeting indicated Mm would grow at about a 7 percent annual rate in the first quarter of 1971 if prevailing money market conditions were maintained, and that a more rapid rate could be expected in the second quarter.
Various views were expressed in regard to the emphasis that should be given monetary and credit aggregates and on the appropriate rate of growth for these aggregates. Some members were concerned about the projected rapid growth of aggregates in the second quarter. Others "stressed the uncertainties attached to the projections . . . and indicated that they were not disturbed by the near-term outlook for the aggregates."
The directive called for "maintaining prevailing money market comiditions while accommodating any downward movements in lommg-term rates." A proviso clause was also included stating that money market conditions should be modified if it appeared the expected growth paths were not achieved for monetary and credit aggregates.
April 6 Meeting
Real GNP was reported at this meeting to have risen substantially in the first quarter; however, unemployment moved back up to 6 percent. Slower real GNP growth was still expected in the second quarter, primarily due to slower growth in sales of motor vehicles and a decline in defense expenditures. The outlook for the second half of 1971 was clouded by the possibility of a steel strike, but assuming a strike of no more than 60 days, projections indicated the growth of real GNP would be somewhat lugher than the anticipated growth for the second quarter.
The U. S. foreign trade account showed only a small surplus in January and February. The deficit in the balance of payments -on the liquidity basis was expected to be much larger in the first quarter than in the second half of 1970, while on an official settlements basis the first-quarter deficit in the payments balance was exceptionally large. These deficits were bolstered by heavy capital flows of interest-sensitive funds.
Following the March meeting, short-term interest rates began to rise, For example, 3-month Treasury bill rates rose about 40 basis points. After rising considerably in previous weeks, yields on new corporate and municipal bonds fell after the March meeting, then later on began to advance agaimi. Both Mi and M 2 were reported to have increased considerably more than had been expected at the previous meeting, while the adjusted credit proxy grew less rapidly than was expected. It was estimated that Ma grew at about an 8 percent annual rate in the first quarter, M 2 at a 17.5 percent rate, and the adjusted credit proxy at an 11 percent rate. In response to the "considerably faster than expected" growth of Mm and Ma, some "slight finning of money mnarket conditions was sought after the March meeting.
Under the assumption of maintaining prevailing money market conditions, analysis indicated Mm would grow even faster in the second quarter than the 8 percent in the previous quarter. Growth of various time deposits, however, was expected to slow substantially, leading to moderation in the growth of M 2 and the credit proxy. The Committee agreed that open market operations should be aimned at "attaining temporarily some minor firming in money market conditions." Some members wanted this firming in order to narrow the difference between short-term interest rates here and abroad so as to moderate capital outflows, The Committee stated its desire to have "more moderate expansion in the monetary aggregates in the second quarter than had occurred in the first," that is, less than 8 percent.
Two members dissented from this directive, favoring in both cases "more firming of money market conditions" than implied in the Coanmittee's directive. Mr. Hayes thought there was a "need for moving toward somewhat higher short-term interest rates in light of the international financial situation" as well as the "risk of excessive growth in the money stock." Mr. Kimbrel thought "higher short-tenn interest rates would be desirable mainly to hold growth in the monetary and credit aggregates to a moderate pace in order to avoid a rekindling of inflationary expectations."
The "Record of Policy Actions" for the May 11 meeting states that initially after the April meeting 'somewhat firmer conditions in the money market"were sought. Then as aggregates, primarily Ma, grew faster than expected, "some slight additioamal fimining was sought." The Federal funds rate advanced from about around 3% percent following the March meeting to about 4¼ percent in the first part of April and remained there until the end of April. "Subsequently, however, despite largescale, reserve-supplying operations by the System, the Federal funds rate advanced to a range around 4½ per cent."
May Through August: Moderating the Growth of Monetary Aggregates and the Rise of Long-Term Interest Rates
Evidence of economic recovery was presented during the meetings of this period, with retail sales and housing starts among the strongest indicators. Unemployment, however, remained around the 6 percent level, and there was little evidence of an abatement of inflationary pressures.
The directives of each meeting during this period called for "moderate" or "more moderate" growth in monetary aggregates. However, except for August, the Committee modified this objective in each directive by stating that "developments in capital markets" should be taken into account. This modifying clause might be interpreted as meaning to minimize upward pressures on long-term rates as finner money market conditions were sought in order to moderate growth of aggregates.
May 11 Meeting
Preliminary Commerce Department figures indicated that real GNP had increased at a 6.5 percent annual rate in the first quarter, after declining at a 3.9 percent rate in the fourth quarter of 1970. More moderate growth in real GNP was expected in the second quarter.
The deficits in the balance of payments were described as "extremely large" for the first quarter. These deficits were attributed to short-term capital outflows resulting frona the differential between interest rates here amid abroad as well as speculation concerning changes in exchange rates. Heaxy flows of dollars into European currencies, such as the German mark, were reported in the first few days of April, but had subsided during the next three weeks. In early May several countries, includimag Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Austria, suspended sales of their currencies for dollars; the Germama mark and Dutch guilder were floated; and the Swiss franc and Austrian schilling were revalued upsvard.
Short-and long-term interest rates rose sharply following tlae April meeting. Growth of the money stock was revised upward for March, bringing Mm to a 9 percent annual rate in the first quarter. Assuming money market conditions similar to those prevailing during most of April, amialysis indicated Ma would increase at about a 9 percent annual rate in the second quartea-. Even with somewhat firmer mnoney market conditions, Mr was expected to grow at about an 8.5 percent rate in the second quarter.
Members of the Committee expressed concern about both rapid growth in monetary aggregates as well as the marked increases in long-term interest rates. Because of these concerns, the Committee decided neither to revert to the money naarket conditiomis which prevailed in April, nor to seek--a slaarp flaming in money market conditions considered necessary to attain a sharp reduction in the grosvtla of aggregates ima the secomad quarter. Iaaitiallv, the Desk was imastructed to mnaimitaimm prevailing mnoaiev mnarket conditiomis imi view of even-keel considerations. Thereafter, if significant deviatiomis froan the expected paths for the aggregates occurred, money market conditions were to he finned, but in a cam,tior,,s manner "witla a view to avoiding undue reactions in capital markets." Becam.mse of uaacertaimaties prevailing imi donaestic fimaancial amad foreigmi exchamige markets, the Accouaat M;anager was giveaa more thami aasamal discretion in carryiaag om mt opema mnarket trammsactions.
June 8 and 29 Meetings
Short-terna imiterest rates contimiued to increase during May-amid Jimmie, a tm-eaid begumi in March. Yields on new issue corporate homads \vere, oma average, about the same in late Jimmie as ima earlr-May, while yields on mammiicipal boaids 'vere somewhat Imiglmer.
At the earlr-Jimmie mneetimmg, it 'a'as reported that the maaomiev stock, as well as other aggregates, imicreased in Ma~at substantially rmiom-e rapid m-ates thama had been expected at time Ma mneeting. At the late Jamne naeetimig, prd imia in am clata i mmd ica e al nitmmmcv was gi-oiving rapidly in Jmmmie, hut less rapid than in Ma. Thims in view of this rapid growth, opemi naarkct operations were dim-ected towamrds somewhat firmner conditions." TIme F'ecleral fumids rate advaaaced fm-om ahout 4½ percent at the timnc of the May mneetimig to abom mt 5½percemit at the timne of the laitc Jumae mneetimag.
At the early Jmmmae mneeting projectiomis indicated that money wmmld imacrease at ahommt a 12 percemit annual rate in the secomid quarter, amid arcmund 10 or 11 percent in the third quarter, assuanimmg amnchanged money market comaditions. With somewhat firmer conditions, little change was expected in the second quarter growth rate of naoney, and a reduction of only about one percent was expected in the third quarter projections. Projections for the growth of money at the late June aneeting were similar to those of the early June meeting.
At both of these meetimigs, members continued to express conceraa about the rapid growth of aggregates and the rise in interest rates. With regard to monetary aggregates, at the early June meeting the Committee stated its desire to seek "somewhat slower growth over conming months than appeared likely to eventraate if prevailing money market conditions were maintained." The directive of the late Jumae mimeeting also called for more moderate growth imi monetary aggregates. With regard to interest rates the Commmmittee stated at both meetings that a sharp firmning of money-market conditions should be avoided, smm as to rmumiimnize upward pressures on lomig-termii imiterest rates.
July. 27 Meeting
Prelimniaaary Commerce Department estimates indicated that real GNP imacreased in the second quarter at about half the rate of the first quarter. Projections by the staff indicated that real CNP would slow somewhat in the tlurd quarter, hut would accelerate in the fourth quairter. Wholesale iaidustrial and comasunaer prices incm-eased "substantially" imi Jumae. It~vas noted that these price rocasures Imadl risen at a faster rate in the second qamarter than earlier in 1971.
The U.S. balance-of-pavnaents deficit for the second qm.marter was described as "extraordiraarily large." This deficit reflected partly the capital outflows, which resulted more frommm expectations of a further realignment of currencies amid less from intem-est dillerentials than in the first quartem-, amid paartlv a deficit in the tm'ade balance comaiparcd with a surphms imi the previous quarter. Remacwed tensiomas imm fmmmeigma exchange niarkets were also mioted imm July.
Sliort-tcm-rmm imiterest rates gcncrally-rmmse after the June 29 mneeting, while lomig-tenu rates chamigecl little on halamice after rising in the second quarter. The mnoney stock rmmseat aai 115 liercemit rate imi the sec-mind quarter, compared with a 9 percemit rate imi the first qm.marter. Growth of other mrmonetarv -aggregates (M. amid the baamik credit proxy) uvere mmoted tmm have decelerated in the second quarter.
Amialysis presemmted at the Jm.mlr-meeting indicated momie wommid expand amt -abmmmmt a 9 pcrcemit annual rate fri the third quarter amid at a mnamch shower rate in the fourth qmmarter Time Comnniittee agreed more moderate growth of aggm'egates remmmained the appropriate objective. Howea-em-, eu-en-keel commsiderations were noted as a comastraimmt mmmi opema mnarket operations until the next nmeeting. Also, as in several previous meetings, developmneaats imm capital markets "-crc to lie taken into account. With these shimmrt-tcm-mmm objectives, the Account Manager uvas-amgain giu-emi muon' tha;aaa usm al discretion in conducting opemi in arket m mpcratimmm IsPagc 29
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August 24 Meeting
The President's New Economic Program was announced on August 15, heading to a tentative reappraisal of the economic outlook by the staff. Expectations of a faster growth in real GNP in the rest of 1971 were enhanced when the President announced the new program. The rate of advance of prices was expected to slow, thus reducing somewhat the current-dollar GNP for the remainder of the year. The balance-of-payments deficit was noted to be increasing sharply after mid-year, and was described as "massive" in the first half of August.
Analysis . presented at this meeting indicated money growth "would moderate somewhat in August and September and would slow substantially further in the fourth quarter," assuming prevailing money market conditions were maintained. It noted that because of the new program, projections for growth of aggregates were subject to sizable errors. The Committee decided in view of the difficulties in assessing the impact of the New Economic Prograni on economic activity, that a "marked change in the stance of policy would be premature." However, the Committee agreed to seek growth in aggregates "well below" the rates of previous months,
September-December: Cautious Move Toward Restoring Money Growth
In the remainder of 1971 there was a reversal of trends for interest rates and monetary aggregates. Interest rates fell considerably from mid-August 1971 to midJanuary 1972, while the money stock exhibited almost no growth. During this period the Committee desired to have moderate growth in monetary aggregates, but also desired that the easing of money market conditions necessary to achieve this growth be made in a cautious manner. Later in this period, as the substantial reversal in the growth of the aggregates became more apparent, somewhat more emphasis was placed on achieving renewed moderate growth in aggregates.
September 21 and October 19 Meetings
At the September meeting the outlook for real GNP was for a "significantly slower" rate of increase in the third quarter than the estimated 4.8 percent rate in the second quarter. Projections for the fourth quarter indicated growth of real GNP would accelerate and price increases would moderate, partly in response to the New Economic Program.
Staff projections reported at the October meeting were optimistic for the first half of 1972. Real GNP was expected to grow at, or slightly below, the expected fourth quarter rate. This projection was based on an expected growth of consumer spending and business capital outlays. Projections of real GNP for both the fourth quarter of 1971 and the first half of 1972 were "appreciably faster" than those before the announcement of the New Economic Program.
Short-and long-term interest rates fell immediately following the President's announcement. The downward trend in interest rates, in general, continued through the October 19 meeting. At these meetings it was noted that both Ma and M 2 had grown at slower rates in August and September than had been anticipated.
Analysis presented at the September meeting indicated that Ma and Ma would grow in the third quarter at rates well below those of the second quarter. If prevailimag money naarket conditions were maintained, money growth was expected to "show further in the fourth quarter." At the October meeting, analysis suggested that money would increase in the fourth quarter at about the same rate as the third, and that money growth was likely to accelerate in the first quarter of 1972.
Directives issued at these two meetings called for "moderate growth in monetary and credit aggregates." The September meeting also contained a modifying clause specifying that developnaents in the capital market should be taken into account. Although the Committee recognized the need for easing money market conditions in order to achieve this moderate growth of aggregates, the Committee at both meetings wanted to avoid an "aggressive" or a "marked" easing in order to achieve moderate growth of money imm the near-term.
One reason given for avoiding an aggressive easing of money market conditions was "to minimize the risk of rekindling inflationary expectations." A second reason given was that in view of the rapid growth of money in the first seven months of the year, "a marked easing designed to stimulate faster growth in the near term would not be warranted," A gradual easing of money market conditions was umadertaken by the Desk following the September and October meetings.
November 16 Meeting
Price indexes showed a marked improvement for September and October, reflecting the price-wage freeze. Staff projections of real GNP growth for the fourth quarter dmf 1971 and the first half of 1972 were reduced slightly from time projections presented at the previous meeting. Following time October meeting, market interest rates comitimaumecl to decline, Money declined slightly in Septenaber and October. Growth of M 1 was anticipated to resume in December amid accelerate imi the first quarter of 1972, assuming naoney market comiditions were maintained similar to or somewhat easier than those prevailing. It was expected that Ma would grow sdmmewhat faster in the fourth quarter than the 4.5 percent rate in the third quarter.
Tbme uncertainty surrounding the transition from Phase I to Phase 11 of the President's New Econonaic Program and time imiternational situation was recognized by the Commnittee as adversely affecting consumer confidence, Some members felt that persistence of weak performance in the monetary aggregates might add to this uncertainty. Some members continued, however, to warn against "undumly aggressive action to stimulate monetary expansion."
The Committee directed that "somewhat greater growth" of monetary aggregates should be attained over the months ahead. The Committee recognized that "appreciably easier money market conditions" might be necessary in order to achiieu'e this growth.
December 14 Meeting
Commerce Department esthnates of real GNP growth were revised upward to 4 percent for the third quarter. Growth of real GNP appeared to be somewhat faster in the fourth quarter as well. The rates of increase in prices and wages were sharply lower during the "freeze" period.
Money changed little in November and, on balance, no growth in money occurred from August to November. Some short-amid iong-tem-m interest rates rose slighily following the November meeting, but most rates began to decline again before the Deceniber meeting. Following the November meeting, the Federal funds rate fell from about 4¾percent to about 4% percent at the time of the Decemnber meeting.
Analysis indicated that easing of money market conditions would likely be required to achieve moderate growth of Ma in December and January. The weakness of M 1 and total member bank reserves over the previous four months was of "considerable concern" to some of the Committee, Some members urged "more aggressive actions" be taken, while others desired a "more cautious and gradual" approach. The Committee agreed, however, ---to promote the degree of ease in bank reserve and money market conditions essential to greater growth in monetary aggregates over the months ahead.
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